Plaintiff's Non-Maritime Employment Not Dispositive in Determining Jones Act Seaman Status

Plaintiff's Non-Maritime Employment Not Dispositive in Determining Jones Act Seaman Status

By: Forrest Guedry

In Cushwa v. Ross, 950 F.Supp. 2d 1276 (2013), the administrator of a deceased sailboat passenger filed a Jones Act claim against the owner of a sailboat. The defendant removed the case to federal court and the plaintiff motioned for remand. Importantly, the plaintiff’s primary employment was as president and CEO of a company that was unrelated to the defendant or the defendant’s sailboat.The issue before the court was whether or not plaintiff’s non-maritime employment precluded Jones Act coverage, and if not, whether plaintiff satisfied the two pronged Chandris inquiry as to seaman status?According to Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347(1995), to qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act an employee must: 1.) Contribute to the vessel’s function or further the accomplishment of the vessel’s mission, and 2.) Have a substantial connection--in both duration and nature--to a vessel’s navigation. The reason behind the ‘substantial connection’ inquiry is to differentiate the sea-based employees from those land-based employees who are not regularly subjected to “the perils of the sea.” Finally, Chandris also established a “no snapshot” doctrine, which requires courts to evaluate the whole relationship between the employee and vessel, rather than simply the connection between the two at the time of the accident or injury.First, the court found that plaintiff’s role as CEO of an unrelated company—a primarily land-based form of employment--was irrelevant as long as the pleadings—taken to be true in favor of the plaintiff—could establish plaintiff’s status as a crewmember under the defendant.The court held that a fact-finder could reasonably conclude that plaintiff satisfied the Chandris test based on three allegations in the plaintiff’s pleadings: 1.) Defendant compensated plaintiff through airfare and meals, 2.) Defendant interviewed plaintiff for the crew position, and 3.) Defendant gave plaintiff orders as a crewmember while the ship was underway. Although Chandris stated that an employee must spend at least thirty percent of their time “in the service of a vessel in navigation,” the court emphasized that this was simply a rough guideline rather than a bright line rule. Thus, the court granted plaintiff’s motion to remand.