U.S. Fifth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Seaman’s Manslaughter Charges against BP Employees
U.S. Fifth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Seaman’s Manslaughter Charges against BP Employees
United States v. Kaluza, U.S. 5th Cir., No. 14-30122, March 11, 2015.
As a result of the DEEPWATER HORIZON spill, the U.S. brought numerous criminal charges against two BP employees on the Rig. The federal grand jury indicted them on 23 counts including 11 counts of seaman’s manslaughter charges under 18 U.S. C. Sec. 1115, as well as 11 counts of involuntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1112 and 1 count of negligent discharge under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1319(c)(1)(A) and 1321(b)(3) The trial court dismissed the seaman’s manslaughter charges under that statute. The United States appealed the dismissal.
BP maintained that the seaman’s manslaughter act did not extend to the DEEPWATER HORIZON maintaining that there was neither territorial nor extraterritorial jurisdiction. In the first instance the defendants argued that there was no territorial jurisdiction as the facility was in international waters. Similarly, extraterritorial jurisdiction did not exist as the government failed to overcome the presumption against extraterritorial application of federal law.The court chose not to address this argument as the issue whether the facility is an OCSLA situs does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction. 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1349(b)(1) grants subject matter jurisdiction to federal district courts while Sec. 1333 is a choice of law provision. Subject matter jurisdiction and choice of law should not be conflated. In any event, as this issue was not properly appealed to challenge the district court’s determination that DEEPWATER HORIZON was erected on the OCS and hence OCSLA applied. Having failed to cross-appeal, the court declined to decide whether DEEPWATER HORIZON qualified as an OCSLA situs.Turning to the merits of whether the defendants could be charged under the seaman’s manslaughter act, the panel did not find the arguments of the United States convincing. The court parsed the words of the statute and applied the “ejusdem generis” canon of construction. The district court considered what common attribute or class of personals the statute implied. “Thus ‘every … other person’ includes only those persons responsible for the ‘marine operations, maintenance or navigation of the vessel.’” This excluded the defendants.The court of appeals agreed: “We find the district court’s definition of the common attribute was correct. The three specific words define a general class of people, specifically those involved in the ‘marine operations, maintenance, or navigation of the vessel.’… In other words, all three are persons in positions of authority responsible for the success of a vessel qua vessel….” The defendants did not fall within this definition.A copy of the decision is available at:http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/14/14-30122-CR0.pdf
