Ryan Indemnity Doctrine Does Not Extend to Vessel Surveyor

Goodloe Marine, Inc. v. Caillou Island Towing Co., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210154 *; 2021 WL 5051983 (M.D. Fl. Tampa Div., Nov. 1, 2021).

Goodloe Marine, Inc. contracted with Caillou Island Towing Company, Inc. to tow a dredge and barge from Texas to Florida. Prior to the voyage, Goodloe contracted with RJA, Ltd. to survey and inspect the dredge and barge to “certify” the tow’s fitness. Nonetheless, the vessels sank on the voyage prior to reaching the destination.

Goodloe sued Caillou Island which then brought a third party complaint against RJA for indemnity or contribution. The third party complaint also tendered RJA to Goodloe pursuant to Rule 14 (c). Caillou Island based its third party complaint on the Ryan Indemnity Doctrine announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atl. Steamship Corp.^[1] and an implied warranty of workmanlike performance.

First, the court addressed whether Caillou Island as owner of the tug could benefit from the warranty while not party to the contract. Citing a plethora of precedent,^[2] the judge noted that privity of contract is not required if there are foreseeable third parties within the zone of responsibility. For purposes of the motion, a warranty of workmanlike performance was implied in the contract; and Caillou Island was foreseeably within the zone of responsibility of RJA. 

Nonetheless, regarding the claim for indemnity, again the trial court relied on an abundance of jurisprudence^[3] which excludes surveyors and classification societies from the ambit of the Ryan Indemnity Doctrine. In addition, the doctrine does not extend to property damage.^[4] Thus, the claim for indemnity by Caillou Island was dismissed.^[5] 

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^[1] 350 U.S. 124 (1956). The doctrine was abrogated by Congress in the 1972 Amendments to the Longshore Act, see: 33 U.S.C. §905(b).

^[2] In re Complaint of Christiansen Marine, Inc., No. 2:95-cv-896, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10920, at *27 (E.D. Va. Apr. 11, 1996) (quoting C.C. Sanderlin v. Old Dominion Stevedoring Corp., 385 F.2d 79, 81-82 (4th Cir. 1967)); see also Brock v. Coral Drilling, Inc., 477 F.2d 211, 215 n.4 (5th Cir. 1973). For example, in Salter Marine, Inc. v. Conti Carriers & Terminals, Inc., 677 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1982).

^[3] Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Bureau Veritas, 338 F. Supp. 999, 1015 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 478 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1973); In re Eternity Shipping, Ltd., Eurocarriers, S.A., 444 F. Supp. 2d 347, 361-63 (D. Md. 2006); see also Meridian Bulk Carriers, Ltd. v. Kinder Morgan Bulk Terminals, Inc., No. 8:07-cv-1422-T-33TGW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62923; 2009 WL 2180582, at *8 (M.D. Fla. July 22, 2009).

^[4] Citing: Cont'l Grain Co. v. Puerto Rico Mar. Shipping Auth., 972 F.2d 426, 439 (1st Cir. 1992); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stokes Oil Co., 863 F.2d 1250, 1256-57 (6th Cir. 1988).

^[5] The court did not address Caillou Island’s claim for contribution. It would appear the maritime rule of comparative fault would apply pursuant to United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., Inc., 421 U.S. 397 (1975) and a claim for contribution. See also, Bosnor, S.A. de C.V. v. Tug L.A. Barrios, 796 F.2d 776 (5^th Cir. 1986).