Latest Case on Jones Act Seaman Status
By Adam Davis
Naquin v. Elevating Boats, No. 12-31258 (5th Cir., March 10, 2014) was a suit under the Jones Act was brought by an employee of Elevating Boats, LLC (“EBI”). Mr. Naquin was a repair supervisor in charge of maintenance and repair of defendant’s fleet of lift boats. He workedon vessels while moored, jacked up, or docked in the defendant’s shipyard canal. The evidence established that he spent 70% of his time working on vessels and 30% in the shipyard’s fabrication shop.He sustained injuries when a crane he was using failed. He broke both feet and had a lower abdominal hernia after he was forced to jump from the falling crane. Another employee of EBI, who was related to the plaintiff (married to plaintiff's cousin), was killed by the the crane when it crushed the building he was working in. Plaintiff did not witness his relative’s death; he did not learn of the death until either later that day or the next day.The jury awarded damages in the amount of $2.4 million: $1,000,000 for past and future physical pain and suffering, $1,000,000 for past and future mental pain and suffering, and $400,000 for future lost wages.Elevating Boats appealed on several points. In particular, Jones Act Status and the amount of the award for past and future mental pain and suffering. The defendant also appealed the jury charge on seaman status and the application of res ipsa though not specifically pleaded by the plaintiff.Regarding the statusof the plaintiff, the Court rejected defendant’s contention that as a land based repairman, the plaintiff’s occupation was specifically covered under the LHWCA, and thus precludes his coverage under the Jones Act. In relying on established precedent, the Court held that the evidence supported status as a seaman. Judge Edith Jones, however, filed a dissent on seaman status and maintained the finding clashed with the “basic point” of Chandris v. Latsis, that is, that land-based employees are not seamen.The more interesting aspect of the decision is the Court’s analysis of damages. The trial court admitted evidence of the plaintiff’s relative’s death to which the defendant objected. The trial judge reasoned that this was relevant to establish Mr. Naquin’s emotional damages.The court addressed the Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall decision, which recognized a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”). There, the plaintiff satisfied the “zone of danger” test adopted by the Supreme Court. But, the Supreme Court denied recovery for merely witnessing the death of a co-employee.Mr. Naquin maintained that as he was in fact physically injured, he could assert a claim for the emotional harm arising from the injury to his relative, that is, “the full spectrum of emotional damages, including those arising from an injury to someone else.” The Court responded: “[d]espite the simplistic of appeal of Naquin’s argument, there is no case law or reasoning to support it.” The Court stated that Gottshall limits damages to those in the zone of danger for emotional harm from being injured or from almost being physically injured, and specifically rejected the relative bystander test, which permits such recovery. Additionally, the court noted that the Jones Act limits recovery for death of a seaman to a certain class of exclusive beneficiaries and to allow a co-employee to recover essentially expands the class of permissible beneficiaries.The Court then reversed the entire award for emotional damages on the basis it could not determine how much was based on the relative’s death. The Court found this also tainted other aspects of damages, but affirmed as to seaman status and liability. The matter was remanded for a retrial of all damages.
