Does Jones Act Coverage Extend to Injuries Sustained from Work-Related Stress?

Does Jones Act Coverage Extend to Injuries Sustained from Work-Related Stress?

By: Forrest Guedry

Skye v. Maersk Line, Ltd. Corp., 12-16433, 2014 WL 1924441 (11th Cir. May 15, 2014)

The Jones Act was enacted to provide seamen with a cause of action when they are injured in the course of their employment due to their employer’s negligence. However, not all work-related injuries are cognizable under the Jones Act, as the Supreme Court ruled in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 (1994). In Skye v. Maersk, the Eleventh Circuit finds that an injury caused by work related stress is not cognizable under the Jones Act as the law only applies to injuries caused by physical perils.Plaintiff William Skye, a former employee of Defendant, Maersk Line Limited, filed a Jones Act claim against Maersk alleging that his diagnosis of a left ventricular hypertrophy was a result of Skye’s working conditions. Skye claimed that Maersk’s negligence produced his injury when Maersk failed to provide Skye with reasonable working hours, sufficient personnel, and acceptable rest time. Further, Skye alleged that Maersk worked him between 90 and 105 hours per week for 70 or 84 days at a time, and that this workload resulted in physical damage to his heart.After testimony from Skye and Skye’s cardiologist about the working conditions’ substantial contribution to Skye’s heart problems, Maersk moved for a directed verdict claiming that Skye could not recover monetary damages for an injury caused by work-related stress based on Gottshall. The District Court denied Maersk’s motion, supplied the jury with a special verdict form, which required the jury to decide whether Skye’s injury was physical or emotional, and advised the jury that a plaintiff cannot receive compensation for a purely emotional injury as the plaintiff can only recover for injuries sustained, at least in part by, physical stress. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Skye, finding that Skye suffered $2,262,299 worth of damages. However, the jury also found Skye to be 75 percent at fault for his injuries. Thus, the District Court reduced Skye’s damage award to $590,574.75. After the verdict in favor of Skye was rendered, Maersk moved for a judgment as a matter of law, again relying on the Gottshall Court’s precedent, but the court denied the motion. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the District Court’s denial of Maersk’s motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo.This Eleventh Circuit’s opinion stressed that the goal and purpose of the Jones Act is to ensure the security of the seamen from physical invasions. Thus, an employer can only be held liable when the employee’s injury results from the employer’s negligent conduct in a way that imminently threatens the employee with physical impact. The court found that even when all inferences drawn based on evidence presented are viewed in a light most favorable to Skye, his injuriesare still not cognizable under the Jones Act. As stated in Gottshall, the Jones Act will not allow seamen to recover for injuries caused from work-related stress because work-related stress does not equate to an imminent physical peril. In Gottshall, the Court found that injuries resulting from work-related stress were not cognizable under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act(a cause of action in negligence for injured railroad employees) because the injuries were not caused by physical impact or by fear of the threat of a physical impact. In O’Donell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.,the Supreme Court ruled that case law interpreting the Federal Employer’s Liability Act is also applicable to Jones Act claims.Thus, under the precedent set forth by Gottshall, Skye’s claim for damages is not cognizable under the Jones Act because a strenuous work schedule and irregular sleep schedule are not physical perils, prerequisite for Jones Act coverage. Further, the Eleventh Circuit opined that allowing compensation for injuries similar to Skye’s would open the floodgates to trivial suits and potential fraudulent claims. In conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the decision that awarded Skye $590,574.75, reversed the denial of Maersk’s motion for a judgment as a matter of law, and rendered a judgment in favor of Maersk.ConcurrenceCircuit Judge Fay concurredin the majority’s opinion because of the binding precedent set forth in Gottshall; however, believes that the main purpose of the Jones Act is to provide employees with a safe workplace. Thus, Judge Fay’s opined that there is no difference between an employee being given a dangerous piece of equipment and an employee being required to work unreasonable hours. Further, the concurring opinion respectfully wishes the Supreme Court to revisit this specific issue.Dissent

Circuit Judge Jordan stresses the great deference the Appellate Court must give to the jury’s factual findings, and in doing so, should not ignore jury’s determination that Skye suffered only physical injuries (Skye’s heart injury) due to Maersk’s negligence. Further, Judge Jordan interpreted the Gottshall Court’s ruling much narrower than the majority distinguishing it. Lastly, Judge Jordan suggested that the Jones Act should not be read in a way that would prohibit employees from recovering from negligent employers when the employers force the employee to complete strenuous and continuous work until that employee suffers physical injury, such as a heart disease.