Punitive Damages and the Doctrine of Unseaworthiness
Punitive Damages and the Doctrine of Unseaworthiness
By: Jillian Talley
Edited by: Molly MacKenzie
Sanchez v. Various Defendants (In re: Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litigation), 2014 WL 3353044 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 2014).
The Sanchez case involves 27 out of approximately 1,800 motions for summary judgment relating to claims for punitive damages in asbestos products liability multidistrict litigation pending in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs are merchant mariners, their representatives, and their spouses who are seeking punitive damages for breach of the warranty of seaworthiness. The district judge divided the opinion into three issues: 1) whether punitive damages are available to seamen bringing actions based on the general maritime doctrine of unseaworthiness, 2) if so, whether punitive damages are available under maritime law in cases arising from exposure to asbestos, and 3) if so, whether the pleadings in these cases claiming entitlement to punitive damages, which were all filed prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), comport with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).The 22-page opinion included a thorough discussion of the remedies historically available in maritime law, with the judge ultimately concluding that punitive damages were not prohibited under the general maritime law principle of unseaworthiness. The court primarily relied on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Atlantic Sounding v. Townsend and McBride v. Estis Well Service. The court in the instant case disagreed with the defendant’s argument that punitive damages were unavailable for an unseaworthiness claim due to the fact that it is a strict liability claim. Rather, the court stated that a vessel owner could be held strictly liable for an unseaworthy vessel regardless of fault, but that the owner may only be liable for punitive damages if he is guilty of willful and wanton conduct. The court also added that punitive damages are not available in wrongful death or survival actions. The court referenced a statement in Miles v. Apex in its reasoning: "Congress has placed limits on recovery in survival actions that we cannot exceed. Because this case involves the death of a seaman, we must look to the Jones Act." Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36 (1990). According to this reasoning, as the Jones Act does not allow for recovery of punitive damages, such damages are never recoverable in a general maritime survival action. The court noted that the seeming anomaly of allowing punitive damages for an injury but not when a person is killed also existed in the common law. The plaintiffs agreed that punitive damages were not recoverable under general maritime law for wrongful death actions, even in those based on unseaworthiness.
Additionally, the court found that punitive damages may be recoverable under general maritime law for exposure to asbestos, subject to review and modification under the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution (relying on State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003)) and general maritime law (citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 482-83 (2008)). Finally, regarding the pleadings standard, the court relied on Twombly and Iqbal to find that Rule 12(b)(6) “requires a plaintiff to plead factual content sufficient to support the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” The complaints lacked any factual basis to find that the vessels were unseaworthy, but because the complaints were filed prior to Twombly, the court gave the plaintiffs time to cure the defect rather than dismissing the claims.
