Fifth Circuit Determines Seaman Status under Fair Labor Standards Act

Fifth Circuit Determines Seaman Status under Fair Labor Standards Act: Tankermen loading and unloading vessels are seamen exempt from Fair Labor Standards Act

By: Forrest Guedry

Coffin v. Blessey Marine Services, Inc., No. 13-20144, 2014 WL 5904734 (5th Cir. Nov. 13, 2014).

Here, the plaintiffs are tankermen who sued their employer, the defendant, under the Fair Labor Standards Act asserting that their work loading and unloading barges was non-seaman’s work. Relying on prior precedent of Owens v. SeaRiver Maritime, Inc., 272 F.3d 698 (5^th Cir. 2011), they maintained that loading and unloading vessels is non-seaman’s work as a matter of law. Though the defendant, Blessey, “produced extensive evidence…that the Plaintiffs’ loading and unloading duties were done as part of the vessel crew and aided the seaworthiness of the vessel” and motioned for summary judgment. However, the trial court ignored the evidence and accepted the interpretation of Owens denying the summary judgment.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and entered judgment for Blessey. The FLSA exempts seamen from overtime pay. The regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor define a seaman as:

An employee will ordinarily be regarded as “employed as a seaman” if he performs, as master or subject to the authority, direction and control of the master aboard a vessel, service which is rendered primarily as an aid in the operation of such vessel as a means of transportation, provided he performs no substantial amount of work of a different character.

The regulations further define work to be substantial “if it occupies more than 20 percent of the time worked by the employee during the workweek.” Ultimately, it is a question of fact usually after a trial.Nonetheless, the application of Owens is inappropriate for these facts. In Owens, the plaintiff was not a member of a crew of a tow and not associated to a particular vessel for a voyage, but instead was a member of a land-based team. Here, the plaintiffs “were members of a unit tow crew, were assigned to particular vessels for a voyage and were expected to perform work on barges that were towed by Blessey’s boats or crews.” Judge Jolly, speaking for the tribunal, stated that its prior decision in Gale v. Union Bag & Paper Corp., 116 F.2d 27 (5^th Cir. 1940) should control. Similar to Gale, the plaintiffs here “ate, slept, lived, and worked” aboard the vessels.

Considering the totality of the facts, “loading and unloading duties along with any related duties constitute seaman work when performed by vessel-based tankermen.” Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying summary judgment which was vacated and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Blessey.