Limitations on Admiralty Jurisdiction
Limitations on Admiralty Jurisdiction
By: Brooke Michiels
Edited by: Molly MacKenzie
Denehy v. Mass. Port Auth., 2014 WL 4402960 (D. Mass Sept. 5, 2014).
On October 7, 2010 an employee of Swissport, a corporation in charge of refueling aircrafts, disabled a safety device and left a pump unattended while refueling. This caused jet fuel to spill into the Boston Harbor at Logan Airport. Denehy and fellow clammers suffered substantial pecuniary harm from the extreme drop in the number of live soft-shell clams in the waters near the airport. Although Denehy attempted to talk with Massport, an agency in charge of the Logan Airport, about the extent of the damages suffered, these discussions were unsuccessful. Denehy and others, sought damages through the National Pollution Funds Center, an agency of the United States Coast Guard. In July 2013 affected clammers began submitting their claims to the Fund, but it wasn’t until August that the Coast Guard assigned responsibility to Massport and Swissport. Swissport denied the claims in December and Massport completely avoided responding to the claims. Denehy filed suit in the United States District Court of Massachusetts seeking damages under general maritime law and the Oil Pollution Act (“OPA”). Defendants sought dismissal, claiming a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.Traditionally, torts that happened in navigable waters were subject to maritime jurisdiction. The Supreme Court later expanded this general rule to address aviation related torts, ruling that the alleged wrong must be significantly related to traditional maritime activity. Foremost extended this requirement to putative admiralty cases outside the scope of aviation. The courts are required to analyze only the general character of the activity, not specifics of the events in question. Foremost provided two important elements for evaluating maritime jurisdiction: (1) the potential of the incident to affect maritime commerce, and (2) the presence of a substantial relationship between the incident and traditional maritime activity. The Supreme Court later clarified that the ‘substantial relationship’ must be between the tortfeasor’s activity and admiralty law.Massport and Swissport’s activities take place completely on land and have no relationship with water vessels or navigable waters. The act of flying over, or merely being adjacent to, the Boston Harbor is not enough to create a substantial relationship with maritime activity. The court noted that even before the tightening of admiralty jurisdiction, accidents on piers, bridges, or ramps leading into the sea were not brought under maritime law. The court dismissed the complaint ruling that the refueling activities, by their general character, were not sufficiently related to traditional maritime jurisdiction.
The Defendants also moved to dismiss the claim brought under OPA, asserting Denehy failed to meet the statute’s presentment requirement prior to filing suit. Under OPA, claimants can only file suit if liability is denied or after a ninety-day period has lapsed without payment on claims. Denehy could not wait the full ninety-day period without allowing the statute of limitations, of three years from injury, to lapse. The court stayed Denehy’s claim under OPA until either ninety days from publication of its opinion or the date that both Swissport and Massport deny his claim, whichever occurs first.
