When is a vessel practically capable of maritime transportation? Vessel Status Continues to Confound Parties

When is a vessel practically capable of maritime transportation? Vessel Status Continues to Confound Parties

By: Rachel Jeandron

Edited by: Tiffany Morales

Gautreaux v. Trinity Trading Grp., Ltd., No. CIV.A. 12-2851, 2014 WL 1414576 (E.D. La. Apr. 11, 2014).

The plaintiff allegedly sustained personal injuries while working aboard the Louisiana Midstream One (“LMO”), “a non-self-propelled barge containing cargo handling equipment which it use[d] to transfer coal and other products midstream between ships and barges in the Mississippi River.” Gautreaux v. Trinity Trading Grp., Ltd., No. CIV.A. 12-2851, 2014 WL 1414576, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 11, 2014). The plaintiff filed suit against his employer and other parties for damages pursuant to the Jones Act and general maritime law, respectively. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment on the issue of the LMO’s vessel status—a threshold issue in the plaintiff’s Jones Act claims.

To determine vessel status, the Court considered “whether the watercraft’s use as a means of transportation on water is a practical possibility or merely a theoretical one.” Id. at *1 (citing Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 497 (2005)). Both the LMO’s activities and its physical characteristics supported a finding of vessel status. The LMO regularly transported people and equipment on the Mississippi River. The LMO had a raked bow, an onboard air-conditioned dining area for crew, and life-saving equipment. Further, the Court noted the LMO’s United States Coast Guard vessel registration. The Court rejected the defendant’s assertion that the LMO’s lack of a bilge pump, navigational aids, and means of mechanical propulsion weighed against a finding of vessel status. Taken together, the evidence weighed in favor of a finding that the LMO had practical capability of maritime transportation, which, in turn, afforded it vessel status. Accordingly, finding guidance in the Supreme Court’s decision of Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 133 S.Ct. 735 (2013), the Court granted the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the vessel status and denied the defendant’s motion.