Seaman’s Status: In the service of a vessel actually means on a vessel

Seaman’s Status: In the service of a vessel actually means on a vessel

By: John Berteau

Edited By: Brooke E. Michiels

Alexander v. Express Energy Servs. Operating, L.P., 784 F.3d 1032 (5th Cir. 2015).

In 1920 Congress passed the Jones Act to provide a cause of action in negligence of the employer or co-employee, for any seaman injured in the course of his employment. Seaman, historically have enjoyed heightened legal protections because of their exposure to the perils of the sea. Congress, however, failed to define the term “seaman” and left its definition to the courts.In 1995 the U.S. Supreme Court, in Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347 (1995) helped to clarify the definition of a Jones Act seaman. In Chandris, the Court established that to qualify as a seaman, a worker must prove that his duties “contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission,” and “have a substantial connection to a vessel in navigation both in duration and nature.”In further quantifying “having a substantial connection to a vessel” the Supreme Court in Chandris relied on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Barrett v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 781 F.2d 1067 (1986). In Barrett, the Fifth Circuit held that a worker spending as much as thirty percent of his working time aboard a vessel did not satisfy the requirement for a substantial connection to a vessel.In an opinion published on May 7, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit helped to further clarify the definition of a Jones Act seaman. In affirming the District Court’s holding, the Fifth Circuit provided guidelines for what are to be considered duties that have a substantial connection to a vessel. Not only are the duties of a worker required to be in service of a vessel greater than thirty percent of the time, but also the duties must also be performed while on a vessel.The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted a motion for summary judgment concluding that the plaintiff, Alexander, did not meet the Supreme Court’s qualifications for a seaman. The court stated:  “It is not sufficient under Chandris (or indeed under Barrett) that Alexander was merely near a vessel on more than 30% of his jobs or that he performed some incidental work on a vessel on those jobs; to be a seaman, he must show that he actually worked on a vessel at least 30% of the time.”