Procedure Before Merits
Procedure Before Merits
By: Megan Finger
Edited By: Brooke E. Michiels
Thomas v. Chevron USA Inc.,2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98742, (S.D. Tex., July 29, 2015)
This case reflects the many procedural issues modern maritime practitioners encounter that bar recovery even before the merits of a case are heard. The plaintiff, Wren Thomas, was the captain of the M/V C-Retriever, a supply vessel owned by Offshore Services Vessels, (“OSV” herein), which supported Chevron’s platform operations off the Nigerian coast. Thomas asserted claims against both OSV and Chevron under the Jones Act, along with maintenance and cure and unseaworthiness. Thomas claimed both companies employed him when pirates off the Nigerian coast kidnapped him. Thomas filed his claims in Texas state court and Chevron timely removed to federal court.The court first had to address three procedural motions: 1. OSV filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction claiming to have no ties to Texas; 2. Chevron filed a motion to dismiss the Jones Act claim, stating it was not Thomas’s actual employer; 3. The plaintiff’s motion to remand for lack of diversity.The court first discussed the rules of law surrounding personal jurisdiction, explaining that because the incidents giving rise to this suit occurred in Nigeria, Texas could not assert specific personal jurisdiction over OSV. Therefore the issue was whether general personal jurisdiction existed. The record indicated that OSV is incorporated in Louisiana and has its headquarters in Louisiana. OSV submitted an affidavit asserting that its principal place of business was in Louisiana and they only had “limited and sporadic” contacts with Texas. Thomas argued that OSV had minimum contacts because: 1) the ECO regional office was located in Texas and that ECO is the same legal entity as OSV; 2) OSV regularly had vessels in port in Texas; 3) both ECO and OSV have previously litigated in Texas. The court rejected Thomas’s argument, noting that ECO’s regional office is actually leased out to another company and only seven administrative employees remain at that location. The court found this insufficient to find OSV was at home in Texas. Next, of OSV’s thirty-nine vessels in its fleet, three OSV vessels have called in Texas ports and these vessels are at the direction of third-party charters and not OSV. The court reasoned that personal jurisdiction must arise out of contacts with the defendant itself and cannot arise through a third-party’s contacts. Finally, the court found the fact that OSV and ECO have been sued in Texas before did not automatically give rise to personal jurisdiction. As a result, the court granted OSV’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction noting that Thomas did not carry his burden to show that contacts existed in Texas.Thomas asserted two arguments for remand. First, he argued Chevron improperly removed because there was not complete diversity between parties; Thomas and OSV were citizens of Texas. Next, Thomas argued that Jones Act claims cannot be removed. When the Jones Act claim became moot, Thomas then asserted he fell under the “borrowed seaman exception.” Chevron did not fall under any of the nine factors that determine whether someone is a “borrowed seaman.” The court held that to remand the case would be inappropriate; the two barriers to removal, lack of diversity and the Jones Act Claim, had been eliminated.As a result of the court’s inquiry into the Jones Act claims against Chevron, the court converted Chevron’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Because of its previous findings, the court determined that OSV and not Chevron was Thomas’s employer; therefore, barring a claim under the Jones Act against Chevron. The maintenance and cure and unseaworthiness claims were also dismissed.The court granted OSV’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, denied Thomas’s motion to remand, and granted Chevron’s converted motion for summary judgment.
