Genuine Issue’s of Fact on Plaintiff’s Connection to Vessels for Seaman’s Status
Genuine Issue’s of Fact on Plaintiff’s Connection to Vessels for Seaman’s Status
By: Megan Finger
Edited by: Brooke E. Michiels
Philip v. Hornbeck Offshore Servs., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133971, (E.D. La., Sept. 30, 2015);2015 WL 5773749 (E.D. La. Sept. 30, 2015); CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-5328 SECTION: "E" (2)The Court in Philip was faced with three motions for summary judgment asserted by defendants on the issues of plaintiff’s status as a seaman under the Jones Act, his status as a borrowed employee, and entitlement to recover under the LHWCA as well as for general maritime negligence. The defendant’s also challenged the plaintiff’s right to a jury trial on these issues. The plaintiff was an employee of defendant, Longnecker Properties Inc., and aboard the M/V SILVERSTAR owned by defendant, Hornbeck Offshore Services, and chartered by defendant, Eni U.S. Operating Co. Philip was aboard the vessel when he allegedly tripped on a wooden board on the deck and fell.On the Jones Act claim the court analyzed the plaintiff’s seaman status under the Chandris two prong test. The parties did not dispute that the plaintiff satisfied the first prong; thus, whether the plaintiff was a Jones Act seaman turned on the substantial connection prong. The court recognized that the plaintiff spent 46 percent of his time working on a fleet of vessels owned by Hornbeck, satisfying the 30 percent requisite. The issue here turned on whether the vessel, or fleet of vessels, on which the plaintiff spent 46 percent of his time, must be owned by his employer in order to qualify as a seaman and overcome Hornbeck’s summary judgment motion. The court held that there was no reason to require that the employer own or operate the group of vessels on which a plaintiff spends at least 30 percent of his time, when the employer need not own or operate the single vessel on which a plaintiff spends at least 30 percent of his time. The plaintiff therefore satisfied the second prong. Further, the court recognized that the plaintiff did nearly all of his work for Hornbeck while the vessel was at sea. Therefore, there were disputed issues of material fact as to the nature of the plaintiff’s connection to the fleet of vessel’s owned by Hornbeck, and summary judgment was improper as to the Jones Act claim.Next, the court analyzed the nine Ruiz factors to determine whether the plaintiff qualified as Hornbeck’s borrowed employee. The court found that: 1) Hornbeck did not have sufficient control over Philip to support a finding of borrowed employee status, 2) Philip was performing Eni’s and Longnecker’s work and not the work of Hornbeck, 3) he did not present sufficient summary judgment evidence that there was an agreement on Philip’s work between Longnecker and Hornbeck, 4) he had worked on Hornbeck’s vessel for a sufficient period of time to appreciate his new work conditions, 5) Longnecker never relinquished control over Philip and remained his employer at all times, 6) Longnecker provided Philip’s tools although the work took place on the Silverstar, 7) Philip’s 130 non-consecutive days out of 277 total days was not a considerable length of time, 8) Hornbeck had no right to discharge Philip, and 9) Longnecker alone had the obligation to pay Philip. With six factors, including the critical control factor, weighing against borrowed employee status, the court found that Philip had failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to his status as Hornbeck’s borrowed employee. Therefore, summary judgment was granted to Hornbeck on this issue.Next, the court found that there were genuine issues of material fact as to the plaintiff’s LHWCA negligence and general maritime negligence claims, and therefore, denied summary judgment on these issues.Finally, having denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s Jones Act claim, the court affirmed the plaintiff’s right to a jury trial on these matters.
