“Situs,” “Status,” and the applicability of the LHWCA

“Situs,” “Status,” and the applicability of the  LHWCA

By: Amanda Meadow

Edited by: Brooke E. Michiels

Johnson v. Abe’s Boat Rentals, Inc., No. CV 14-2213, 2016 WL 127982 (E.D. La. Jan. 12, 2016).The plaintiff, Johnson, was a payroll employee of Wood Group PSN, Inc. working on a platform owned by Apache Corporation (“Apache” herein). Johnson was injured when the M/V MISS SYDNEY, a vessel returning him to shore, operated by Morel, an employee of Island Operating Company, Inc. (“Island” herein), collided with the M/V JOHNSON ABE, a vessel owned by the Abe’s Boat Rentals, Inc. (“Abe’s” herein). Johnson filed claims under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act (“LHWCA” herein), and against Abe’s and Island under general maritime law. Abe’s joined Apache as a defendant, contending that Apache was negligent for its own actions, alleging untrained personnel and lack of safe procedures. If the LHWCA applied, Apache would not be liable for Johnson’s negligence; whereas if it did not, Apache was not protected from potential liability.Ultimately, the Court addressed two main issues, (1) Whether the plaintiff was a covered employee under the LHWCA, and (2) If the plaintiff was a covered employee under the LHWCA, was he a borrowed employee, which would bar Johnson’s and Abe’s claims against Apache and also bar Johnson's claim against Island?In order to be a covered employee under the LHWCA, a two-part test is applied. The “situs” test requires that an employee be injured on the navigable waters of the United States, and focuses on where the employee was injured rather than where he worked. This test was satisfied because Johnson’s injury occurred on the MISS SYDNEY on the navigable waters of the United States.The “status” test required that the claimant not be merely present on a vessel at the time of injury, but that the claimant actively engaged in maritime employment. Johnson’s contention that he performed maintenance on the MISS SYDNEY was not adequate to determine whether his presence on the vessel was merely fortuitous or more substantial, and key facts needed clarification to determine the applicability of the LHWCA.Though Apache argued that Johnson was a borrowed employee and Apache could not be vicariously liable, the court clarified that Abe’s did not seek recovery on the grounds of respondeat superior; rather Abe’s alleged Apache’s own negligence by inadequately training and licensing employees and failing to have safe procedures in place.The court ultimately denied Apache and Island’s motions for summary judgment, because both were contingent upon the applicability of the LHWCA, and material issues of fact needed clarification before this determination could be made. [ The original version of this submission was posted on February 1st, however was amended on February 10th to edit an error in the original submission]