Northern District of Ohio Departs from the Southern District of Florida’s Ruling on the Applicability of the Collateral-Source Rule in General Maritime Law
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio Departs from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida’s Ruling on the Applicability of the Collateral-Source Rule in General Maritime Law
by: Lindsey Ajubita
Edited by: Andrew Lifsey
Buccina v. Grimsby, 96 F. Supp. 3d 706, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44482, 2015 AMC 973 (N.D. Ohio 2015).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio denied the plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine to preclude the application of Robinson v. Bates, 857 N.E.2d 1195 (Ohio 2006). In Robinson, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the difference between the original amount of a medical bill and the amount accepted as full payment from an insurance company (“contractual discount”) is not a “benefit” for purposes of the collateral-source rule. By excluding Robinson, the plaintiffs hoped to shield the contractual discount and value their damages at the total of the medical charges.The collateral-source rule excludes evidence of benefits paid by a collateral source as a means to reduce the liability of a tortfeasor. The issue then is whether the reduced price that the insurance company paid for the medical treatment is a “payment.” In Jones v. Carnival Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101999 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 24, 2006), the court looked to the state law of Florida and the Florida Supreme Court’s determination that a discounted rate payed by an insurance company is a discharge of a debt, which qualifies as a benefit under the collateral source rule. Therefore, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida found that the contractual benefit must be excluded if it would result in the reduction of the tortfeasor’s liability. In contrast to the Florida Supreme Court, the Ohio Supreme Court in Robinson determined that the contractual discount is not a “benefit” and should not be excluded from evidence by the collateral-source rule.Although maritime law does not address the issue of whether evidence of this discounted rate is admissible in tort cases as proof of the reasonable value of the plaintiff’s treatment, the court determined that the collateral-source rule applies to admiralty cases, because it is a matter of federal law. Looking to Jones and other authority on the issue, the Court in Buccina reasoned that a federal court may rely on state law in the absence of a general maritime provision on an issue. Therefore, the trial judge held that it was appropriate for a federal court of Ohio to rely on the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Robinson in its consideration of the collateral-source rule.