What’s in a name? Fifth Circuit upholds the difference between an FLSA seaman and Jones Act Seaman in wage dispute.

What’s in a name? Fifth Circuit upholds the difference between an FLSA seaman and Jones Act Seaman in wage dispute.

By Ainsley Davidson Fagan

Halle v. Galliano Marine Serv., L.L.C., No. 16-30558, 2017 WL 1399697 (5th Cir. Apr. 19, 2017); Halle v. Galliano Marine Serv., L.L.C., No. 16-30558, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 6833 (5th Cir. Apr. 19, 2017)This case arises from a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) wage dispute for alleged unpaid overtime wages. Determining whether  an ROV Technician was a seaman under the FLSA was a case of first impression for the Fifth Circuit.Under the FLSA, employers are required to provide overtime compensation to any employee that works more than forty hours a week unless the employee or employer meets the criteria for an exemption. The plaintiff, Kyle Halle (Halle) was a remotely operated vehicle (ROV) technician and ROV Supervisor for the defendants Galliano Marine Service, LLC and C-Innovation, LLC (“the defendants”). When service and repair of offshore underwater drilling rigs cannot be completed by human divers due to depth or water conditions, ROVs are used to to perform the task.The FLSA provides an exemption for seamen. There are two prongs under the FLSA that must be met to meet the seaman exception. To be a seaman, an employee must be “subject to the authority, direction, and control of the master” and “the employee’s service is primarily offered to aid the vessel as a means of transportation, provided that the employee does not perform a substantial amount of different work.”[1] In order for the Court to make its determination, it needed to review the employee’s duties based on the work he actually  performed  and not on what the work itself was called or the location of its performance. Thus, the determination of a seaman is fact intensive.Before it began its analysis, the Court reiterated that the standard of “seaman” status under the FLSA is not based on the the Jones Act standard and noted that the Jones Act allows for a broad construction for more remedies whereas a seaman under the FLSA is narrowly constructed to minimize the number of employees who would lose protection.In its analysis of the first prong, the Court disagreed with the lower court’s finding that an ROV was a vessel under the FLSA based on Halle’s direction and command. Here, the Court found no evidence that an ROV itself was a vessel; rather, the  panel found that only the ROV Support Vessel qualified as a vessel under this prong. The Court noted that Halle did not report to the vessel’s chain of command. However, because there was a contrasting affidavit from another worker, the Court noted that summary judgment was not proper.Nonetheless, the Court found the second prong dispositive. The critical issue in analyzing this prong is determining whether the “primary purpose” of the particular individual’s work is safe navigation of the ship. The Court  relied on Wailing v. W.D. Haden Co.[2] as a basis for its decision. Under Wailing, prior panel of the Fifth Circuit found that a dredgeman’s work was more industrial  that  its connection to maritime activity was a small fraction of the job and merely incidental to the position;  hence,  the employee is not a seaman under the FLSA. In this case, the Court found that the work performed by Halle was analogous to that of the dredgeman in Wailing and  more “industrial” in nature.Thus, the Court unanimously held that summary judgment for the employer was error and  reversed the lower court’s decision .[1]While this test is not binding, the Fifth Circuit gives great weight to this test.  Coffin v. Blessey Marine Servs., Inc., 771 F.3d 276, 279 (5th Cir. 2014).[2] Walling v. W. D. Haden Co., 153 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1946)