Asbestos Claimant Barred by Longshore Act State Statute of Limitations Bars Any Other State Law Claims

Kirkland v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated, 2018 WL 4343410; 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154501

By: Gregory Burts

In this case, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi granted Defendant Huntington Ingalls Incorporated’s Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed pro se Plaintiff’s claims of injury in “violation of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.”[1] At issue in this case was whether Plaintiff’s claims were preempted by the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act (LHWCA), and if not, respectively barred by Mississippi’s statute of limitations.[2]Specifically, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that Defendant violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to protect his “safety and health” and prevent his exposure to “harmful chemicals.”[3] Defendant argued that Plaintiff’s claims fell under “the exclusive jurisdiction” of the LHWCA, and in the alternative, that Plaintiff’s claims were time barred by   § 15-1-49(1) of the Mississippi Code.[4] Plaintiff responded by stating an additional claim “under the Dual Capacity Doctrine for strict liability in tort.”[5] In reply, Defendant contended that to the extent these additional claims were not preempted by LHWCA, they were subsequently time barred by § 15-1-49(1) and § 15-1-49(2) of the Mississippi Code.The court determined that even if some of Plaintiff’s claims fell outside the provisions of the LHWCA, they would be time barred by “the three-year statute of limitations found at Mississippi Code § 15-1-49(1).[6] Concluding that Plaintiff’s claims arose out of his involvement in “either ship construction or repair,”[7] the court held that Plaintiff’s claims were preempted by the LHWCA, which warrants claim dismissal and grants Defendant immunity from the complaint filed by Plaintiff.The court next examined Plaintiff’s constitutional claims sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The court noted that though Plaintiff could have properly asserted his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff still could not have recovered because he failed to prove that Defendant “was a state actor or that it acted under color of law, as required by § 1983.”[8]As a result, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment was granted as the court found that Plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proof in demonstrating the existence of genuine issue of material fact for resolution at trial.[9][1] Kirkland v. Huntington Ingalls Inc., 1:17-CV135-HSO-JCG, 2018 WL 4343410, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 11, 2018).[2] Id. at 5 (see Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (West)).[3] Id. at 1.[4] Id.[5] Id. at 3.[6] Id.[7] Id.[8] Id. at 6.[9] Id.

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