SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR SHIPOWNER PROPER Third-Party Medical Provider Not Agent of Shipowner

Randle v. Crosby Tugs, L.L.C., 911 F.3d 280 (5th Cir. 2018)

By: Shelia Tolar

In a case concerning a seaman-plaintiff’s personal injury and vicarious liability claims, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendant. Plaintiff-Appellant, David Randle was a seaman employed by Defendant-Appellee, Crosby Tugs. Randle felt ill while working aboard the Crosby-owned vessel and went to rest in his cabin. After a crewmember found Randle unresponsive on the cabin floor, the captain immediately called 911. The Louisiana Emergency Response Network (LERN) directed the ambulance transporting Randle to Teche Regional Medical Center (TRMC). The doctors at TRMC failed to properly diagnose Randle, leaving him permanently disabled. He then sued Crosby Tugs in the U.S. District Court, Eastern District of LA, claiming that the defendant negligently failed to provide prompt and adequate medical care, provided an unseaworthy vessel, and failed to provide maintenance and cure. Crosby Tugs settled the maintenance and cure claim prior to trial. Randle appealed the district court’s decision granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the negligence claims.The U.S. Fifth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “If the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party” then a genuine dispute about a material fact exists. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The court determined that Randle did not introduce evidence showing that the Crosby breached its “duty to provide prompt and adequate medical care” to him by calling 911. De Zon v. Am. President Lines, 318 U.S. 660, 667 (1943). Therefore, summary judgment for Crosby was proper.Randle further claimed that Crosby was vicariously liable for medical malpractice because the TRMC doctor misdiagnosed him. Specifically, Randle argued that TRMC was the Crosby’s agent, and a shipowner is liable “for the injuries negligently inflicted on its employees by its ‘officers, agents, or employees.’” Hopson v. Texaco, Inc., 383 U.S. 262, 263 (1966). According to the Supreme Court, an agent is one “performing, under contract, operational activities of [the] employer.”  Id. at 264. Under agency theory, applied by the court, the principal party must expressly manifest a desire that a third-party act as its agent. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.01 (Am. Law Inst. 2006). However, LERN, not Crosby, directed the ambulance to take Randle to TRMC. Crosby took no affirmative action to select TRMC as its agent. Therefore, TRMC was not an agent of Crosby. Because there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding defendant’s vicarious liability, summary judgment was proper.Because there was no genuine issue of material fact that defendant breached its duty to provide prompt and adequate medical care by calling 911 or that defendant was vicariously liable for the actions of its agent, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.