SCOTUS DECIDES DUTRA GROUP v. BATTERTON
By: Don K. Haycraft
Today, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in this landmark case concerning punitive damages. The six justices in the majority opinion reversed the Ninth Circuit and resolved a circuit split on this issue. The question presented was whether punitive damages may be awarded to a Jones Act seaman in a personal injury suit alleging a breach of the general maritime duty to provide a seaworthy vessel. Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Thomas, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor.
The plaintiff, a Jones Act seaman employed by Dutra Group,was injured on the defendant’s dredge vessel on the West Coast. A hatch blew open and crushed his hand. Thedistrict court denied the defendant’s motion to strike the punitive damagesclaim; the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Thisdecision set up a split in the circuits, because three years earlier the en banc Fifth Circuit in McBride v. Estis Well Service[1]held that punitive damages were notavailable under the rationale of an earlier Supreme Court case, Miles v. Apex Marine.[2]
Justice Alito’s opinion focused on an historical approachthat found an absence of punitive damage awards in unseaworthiness cases. Accordingly, the opinion notes that once theJones Act was passed by Congress in 1920, legislative remedial schemes forseamen should be the watchword for courts sitting in admiralty. The Jones Act negligence action allows onlycompensatory damages; its twin, general maritime law’s unseaworthiness cause ofaction, should not overstep legislative limitations. Thus, the uniformity principle expressed in Miles prevailed with its admonition thatcourts should not exceed legislative limits. The opinion distinguishes the AtlanticSounding v. Townsend case, in which a 5-4 majority opinion (written byJustice Thomas) ruled that punitive damages wereavailable to a Jones Act seaman whose employer arbitrarily and capriciouslyfails to pay the injured or ill seaman maintenance and cure. In contrast to unseaworthiness, there was anhistorical record of punitive damage awards in the maintenance and cure context. Finally, Justice Alito noted that policyconsiderations disfavor allowing punitive damages for unseaworthiness becausemany competitor shipping nations do not have punitive damages. Affirmance of the Ninth Circuit view wouldharm American shipping interests.
In dissent, Justice Ginsberg wrote that Atlantic Sounding controlled because there was a long history ofpunitive damages awards as part of the general maritime law, albeit a paucityin the specific context of unseaworthiness. While the Jones Act provided a newnegligence cause of action, Congress did not curtail preexisting remedies, andthis included punitive damages. Statutory and historical analysis contains “not a hint” that the JonesAct limited seamen’s remedies already in place. In her policy analysis, Justice Ginsberg countered that punitivedamages’ availability in maintenance and cure actions has not created a “tidalwave” of such actions; instead, she writes punitive damages for wanton andwillful creation of an unseaworthy condition in a vessel will deter suchconduct.
We are deeply indebted to Don Haycraft of Liskow & Lewis for sending this decision of the U.S. Supreme Court to us. The text of this opinion is at the following link:
https://casetext.com/case/dutra-group-v-batterton
[1] 768F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2014).
[2] 498U.S. 19 (1990).
