Reversing Course
Roberts v. Carnival Corp., No. 19-14993, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 26805, 2020 WL 4931653, (11th Cir. Aug. 24, 2020).
By: Brendan Bowen
In this decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found reversable error when the district court erroneously resolved an appellant’s personal injury claim through a Motion For Dismissal pursuant to Federal Code of Civil Procedure Rule 12.[1] The appellant, Ms. Erika Roberts, sought to recover damages for injuries sustained due to a slip and fall aboard a Carnival Corporation cruise ship. The district court dismissed this action, finding that Ms. Robert’s claims were time barred under the terms of her ticket contract.
On appeal, Ms. Roberts contended that the district court erroneously considered documents outside of the complaint when reaching its decision. Specifically, the district court relied upon the contents of the ticket contract and acceptance report attached to the original complaint. Ordinarily, the court must first convert a motion for dismissal into one for summary judgment before it may consider materials outside of the complaint.[2] However, this conversion is unnecessary if the additional materials are (1) attached to the complaint, (2) referred to in the complaint, (3) central to the plaintiff’s claim, and (4) of undisputed authenticity.[3] Given the lack of dispute over authenticity, the district court invoked this exception and found the ticket contract was central to the personal injury claim. The trial court provided no explanation for consideration of the acceptance report, to which the complaint makes no reference.[4]
The Eleventh Circuit reversed on two alternative grounds. First, the court found that neither the ticket contract nor the acceptance report was central to the personal injury claim. The ticket contract has relevance to issues of venue and the affirmative defense of timeliness. However, these issues are separate and distinct from the appellant’s substantive claims of negligence.[5] Such claims cannot be properly resolved on a motion for dismissal; therefore, the district court erred by failing to convert the motion into one for summary judgment.
In the alternative, the Eleventh Circuit found that dismissal on the grounds of contractually imposed timelessness was improper because the claim was not time barred on its face.[6] Parties are free to contract out of the standard three-year statute of limitations for maritime tort claims down to a minimum of one year for personal injury actions.[7] However, to be enforceable, such contractual provisions must be reasonably communicated to the passenger. Reasonable communication is determined by a two-factor test: (1) the physical characteristics of the clause and (2) the passenger’s opportunity to become meaningfully informed of the contract terms.[8]
The first factor calls for an examination of the objective characteristics of the contract clause itself. The court may consider font size, placement, readability, and the like. The second factor calls for an examination of the subjective circumstances pertaining to the passenger’s ability to review the contract clause before embarkation.[9] Ms. Roberts disputed the enforceability of the time bar on the grounds that it was not reasonably communicated to her. That question implicates the subjective circumstances prong and cannot be resolved through objective examination alone. Therefore, the district court erred in resolving the matter through a motion to dismiss, providing Ms. Roberts with no opportunity to present evidence under the second factor in the test. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the order and remanded the matter for further proceedings.
[1] Roberts v. Carnival Corp., No. 19-14993, 2020 WL 4931653, at *4 (11th Cir. Aug. 24, 2020).
[2] Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 2005).
[3] Id.
[4] See 2020 WL 4931653, at *1.
[5] Id. at *4.
[6] United States ex rel. Hunt v. Cochise Consultancy, Inc., 887 F.3d 1081, 1085 (11th Cir. 2018).
[7] See 46 U.S.C. § 30508(b)(2) (2018).
[8] Caron v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 910 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 2018).
[9] Ward v. Cross Sound Ferry, 273 F.3d 520, 525 (2nd Cir. 2001); Shankles v. Costa Armatori, S.P.A., 722 F.2d 861, 866 (1st Cir. 1983).
