General Maritime Law Preempts Products Liability Act for Faulty Tow Connection on Lake Powell
Marandola v. Pueblo Suzuki, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-02113, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157476, 2022 WL 3908864 (D. Colo. Aug. 31, 2022).
Author: Tim Duncan
In a decision1 issued by the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, the court evaluated whether Colorado’s “innocent seller” statute2 should supplement, preempt, or yield to federal maritime law.3 Upon recommendation by United States Magistrate Judge Mix, the district court judge affirmed the magistrate’s recommendation that federal maritime law preempts (though the court uses the term “displaces”) the Colorado statute.4 As the magistrate’s recommendation is the more extensive analysis of the issues, it is the subject of the following discussion.
The dispute resulted from a recreational boating accident which occurred on Lake Powell, an artificial reservoir fed by the Colorado River and located in both Utah and Arizona.5 While the Plaintiff was attempting to tow a disabled boat, a carabiner (a D-shaped or oblong metal ring with one spring-hinged side, used primarily in mountain climbing to hold freely running ropes) connected to the anchor line failed and struck her in the head.6 She subsequently filed a products liability lawsuit against three defendants: Land ‘N’ Sea Distributing, Inc. (hereinafter “Seachoice”), Attwood Corporation (hereinafter “Attwood”), and Pueblo Suzuki, Inc. (hereinafter “ROMOBOCO”).7 The Plaintiff alleged that either Seachoice or Attwood sold the anchor line and carabiner to ROMOBOCO, which in turn sold them to the owner of the boat involved in the incident.8
The Plaintiff filed a Motion to Clarify Choice of Law, requesting that the court decide: (1) whether admiralty jurisdiction exists, and (2) whether, regarding the seller(s)’ liability, Colorado state law or federal maritime law applies.9
In addressing whether admiralty jurisdiction exists, Magistrate Judge Mix relied on jurisprudence from the Tenth Circuit, which held that Lake Powell, as it is situated in two states, is “navigable water” for purposes of federal admiralty jurisdiction.10 Judge Mix found that the incident in question satisfied the requisite maritime enquiries, because: (1) the incident could lead to a disruption in the water course itself and have a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce, and (2) the general character of the activity giving rise to the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.11 Thus, the court has admiralty jurisdiction.12
The bulk of her Recommendation focused on the second issue of the Plaintiff’s Motion – whether Colorado state law or substantive maritime law applied in determining the extent of the seller(s)’ liability.13 Colorado’s “innocent seller” statute prohibits products liability actions against a seller, unless: (1) the seller is also the manufacturer, or (2) the plaintiff has attempted and failed to obtain jurisdiction over the manufacturer.14 Courts exercising federal admiralty jurisdiction, on the other hand, have widely adopted Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,15 which allows plaintiffs to directly sue sellers of defective products under the doctrine of strict liability.16
Magistrate Judge Mix concluded that, because courts applying maritime law have almost universally adopted Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts (which includes strict liability in products liability cases), such law is deemed to be “entrenched federal precedent.”17 Existing jurisprudence allows for the supplementation of state law to “fill in the gaps” of General Maritime Law when it is silent on an issue; but, it may not be applied when it would conflict with maritime law.18 Judge Mix concluded that the federal maritime law had no such “gaps” to fill, and the Colorado statute was directly contrary to such maritime law.19 The Defendant appealed this portion of the ruling, asserting that state law could supplement General Maritime Law.20
The District Court subsequently affirmed and adopted the magistrate’s recommendation that: (1) the court had admiralty jurisdiction; (2) substantive maritime law with its adoption of Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts applied to this case; and (3) Colorado’s innocent seller provision was not applicable, as it is preempted by General Maritime Law.21
1 Marandola v. Pueblo Suzuki, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-02113, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157476, 2022 WL 3908864 (D. Colo. Aug. 31, 2022).
2 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-402 (2003).; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-21-402 (West 2003).
3 Marandola, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157476, 2022 WL 3908864.
4 Id. at *1., Id. at *1.
5 Marandola v. Pueblo Suzuki, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-02113, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45178, at *7, 2022 WL 704653, at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 28, 2022).
6 Id. at *2., Id. at *1.
7 Id., Id.
8 Id. at *3., Id.
9 Id., Id.
10 Marandola, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45178, at *7, 2022 WL 704653, at *2.
11 Id. at *9., Id. at *3.
12 Id. at *10, Id.
13 Marandola, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45178, 2022 WL 704653.
14 Id. at *12., Id. at *4.
15 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (Am. Law Inst. 1965).
16 Id.
17 Marandola, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45178, at *14, 2022 WL 704653, at *5.
18 Id. at *18., Id. at *7.
19 Id., Id.
20 Marandola, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157476, at *1, 2022 WL 3908864, at *1.
21 Id. at *6, Id. at *3.
