Decoding the Sanchez Factors: Clarity or Chaos in the Fifth Circuit

Santee v. Oceaneering International, Incorporated, 110 F.4th 800 (5th Cir. August 7, 2024, Stewart J.).

            Plaintiff, Shanon Santee (“Santee”), worked for Oceaneering International, Incorporated (“Oceaneering”) as a remote-operated vehicle technician.[1] Oceaneering primarily provides subsea engineering and exploration services.[2] While working aboard the M/V DEEPWATER CONQUEROR, a drill ship under contract with Chevron, Santee allegedly injured his shoulder and neck while servicing a remote operated vehicle.[3] On September 2021,  he filed suit against Oceaneering, Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Incorporated, and Chevron USA, Incorporated (collectively “Defendants”) in Texas state court alleging claims pursuant to the Jones Act, General Maritime Law, and the Savings to Suitors Clause.[4] Defendants removed the case to federal court in the Southern District of Texas, claiming that there was exclusive federal jurisdiction due to Santee fraudulently pleading Jones Act seaman claims.[5] Summary judgment on his status was granted by the district court in favor of Defendants.[6]

            Initially, the appellate panel affirmed the district judge[7] but on rehearing, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded and based its opinion entirely on the issue of whether Santee fraudulently pleaded Jones Act seaman status.[8] The Supreme Court has established that a person is a seaman if: (1) the person’s duties contribute to the function or mission of the vessel, and (2) they have a connection to the vessel or fleet of vessels that is substantial in nature and duration.[9] The  panel  relied on its prior en banc opinion, Sanchez v. Smart Fabricators of Texas, L.L.C.[10], four relevant factors to the second prong of the seaman test. These factors address whether a worker’s relationship to the vessel is substantial in nature and is intended to determine (1) whether a party was subject to “the perils of the sea,” (2) whether a party owes “his allegiance to the vessel, rather than to a shoreside employer,” (3) whether a party’s work is seas-based or involves sea going activity, and (4) whether a party’ assignment to the vessel is limited to a discrete task after which the person’s connection to the vessel ends.[11]

            The Fifth Circuit  determined that the Appellant satisfied both prongs of the jurisprudential test utilized to determine an individual’s seamen status under the Jones Act.[12] The first prong was “easily satisfied” as the contribution made by Santee was a clear contribution to the function and mission of the vessel as the remote operation of vehicles and related technician services support the vessel’s underwater drilling efforts.[13]

            The Sanchez factors are considered for the second prong of the seaman test which caused the court to devote considerable analysis distinguishing the facts of Santee’s employment from those of the plaintiff in Sanchez. The court did not address the satisfaction of the “sea-based work” or facing “perils of the sea” factors aside from simply stating that Santee’s work was distinguishable from that of the employee in Sanchez.[14]

            The appellate panel addressed the allegiance factor next by stating that a maritime worker may possess dual allegiance to both a vessel and to his shoreside employer.[15] The court highlighted that Santee spent over 96% of his employment time, over five years, specifically assigned to the M/V DEEPWATER CONQUEROR, having reported to and taken orders from the captain of the vessel.[16] It also concluded that in addressing a fraudulent pleading inquiry, the evidence from Santee’s affidavit and work history documents were sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact and survive summary judgment.[17]

            The appeal court next assessed the assignment factor and concluded that Santee’s work as a technician for remote operated vehicles was not discrete or transient like that of a longshoreman when a vessel comes into port.[18]  It distinguished Santee’s assignment from previously designated discrete assignments and explained that discrete assignments on a docked vessel being a worker’s only connection to the vessel was not comparable to Santee’s assignment.[19] The assignment of Santee was not comparable to that of the employee in Sanchez because Santee did not have an end date to his assignment and he believed that he was indefinitely assigned to the vessel.[20] Santee never being formally assigned to work aboard a specific vessel was not  dispositive in determining whether Santee’s assignment was discrete or not.[21] Further, the panel also put no weight on the fact that Santee could pick up extra jobs between work on the vessel.[22]

            After determining that Santee had sufficient grounds to set forth a Jones Act claim, the Fifth Circuit determined that the district court did not resolve all disputed questions of fact and law in favor of the plaintiff.[23] It specifically held that, considering all the Sanchez factors, including the assignment and allegiance factors, Santee’s Jones Act claim was not baseless in law pled only to frustrate the federal jurisdiction.[24] Based on this determination, the court held that when a removing defendant fails to show that a plaintiff has fraudulently pleaded a Jones Act claim, the matter must be remanded back to state court.[25]

           By Fraser Mitchell, J.D. Candidate 2025 Loyola College of Law. The views herein are the author’s alone.

           Please see a copy of the opinion attached.

[1] Santee, 110 F.4th at 803.

[2] Id.

[3] Id.

[4] Id, at 804.

[5] Id.

[6] Santee, 110 F.4th at 804.

[7] See Santee v. Oceaneering International, Incorporated, 95 F.4th 917 (March 12, 2024).

[8] Id, at 805.

[9] Id, (citing McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 354–55 (1991)).

[10] 997 F.3d 564, 574 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 368 (1995)).

[11] Santee, 110 F.4th at 805.

[12] Id.

[13] Id, at 806.

[14] Id.

[15] Id, at 807.

[16] Santee, 110 F.4th at 807.

[17] Id.

[18] Id.

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Santee, 110 F.4th at 807

[22] Id.

[23] Id, at 808.

[24] Id, (citing Lackey v. Atl. Richfield Co., 990 F.2d 202, 207 (5th Cir. 1993)).

[25] Santee, 110 F.4th at 808.